but it is so subject that it must be considered as also *making the law* for itself and precisely on this account as first of all subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author)." Immanuel Kant. *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, translated and analysed by H.J. Paton. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964, pp. 98-99.

4. Anthony Trollope. *The Warden*. New York: Washington Square Press, 1962, pp. 54-56.

5. Robert Paul Wolff. *The Autonomy of Reason*. New York: Harper and Row, 1973, p. 15.

6. In this connection, it is worth noting Genevieve Lloyd's demonstration of the "maleness" of reason itself, defined as it has been throughout the history of philosophy by exclusion of everything that is associated with, or believed to constitute, the feminine. Genevieve Lloyd. *The Man of Reason*. London: Methuen, 1984.

7. In the foregoing discussion I am indebted to O.J. Flanagan, Jr., and J.E. Adler in their paper "Impartiality and Particularity," *Social Research*, Vol. 50, No. 3, October 1983.

8. In much of this discussion of utilitarianism I am indebted to Susan Sherwin in her paper "Ethics: Towards a Feminist Approach," *Canadian Women Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 2, Spring 1985.

9. This is true of the early social contract theories developed by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, as well as John Rawls' more recent version of the theory, elaborated in *A Theory of Justice*.

10. Virginia Held. *Rights and Goods*. New York: Macmillan, The Free Press, 1984, p. 75.

11. It is worth noting that, while an excessively heteronomous person might be described as credulous, gullible, compliant, passive, submissive, overdependent, or servile, it is difficult to find a term to refer to excessive autonomy. John Benson suggests that "solipsism" might do, or "arrogant self-sufficiency." John Benson. "Who is the Autonomous Man?," *Philosophy*, Vol. 58, 1983, p. 5. The list of terms to describe an excessively autonomous person is Benson's as well.

12. On the ontological level, this gives rise to the view that there is indeed a problem about "other minds" that, rather than taking shared modes of being as a starting point for the development of moral theroy, the onus is upon one to demonstrate that it is reasonable to take other human beings to be thinking, feeling creatures, as much like oneself as different.

13. Some parts of my discussion of ecological thinking, and some of the following discussion of Caroline Whitbeck's work and of the friendship model, appear in virtually the same form, though differently framed, in my "Second Persons," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Supplementary Vol. 13, forthcoming.

14. An ecological concern is adumbrated in Alastair MacIntyre's *After Virtue* (London: Duckworth, 1981) where he writes about the loss of human community as a place where human beings can flourish. MacIntyre deplores individualistic self-preoccupation, urging that human beings are not, and probably cannot be, self-making, but help to create and sustain each other. While the conception of the virtues to which he believes human beings should return is static and perhaps excessively conservative, there is in his work something of a move toward acknowledging the importance of human interdependence which I would take to characterize ecological thinking.

15. Caroline Whitbeck. "Feminist Ontology: A Different Reality," in Carol Gould, editor, *Beyond Domination*. Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Allenheld, 1983, p. 66.

16. I am thinking, here, of the implications of Jane Flax's observation that "As long as patriarchy exists, differences will inevitably be translated into relations of dominance and submission, superiority and inferiority." Jane Flax. "Mother-Daughter Relationships: Psychodynamics, Politics and Philosophy," in H. Eisenstein and A. Jardine, editors, *The Future of Difference*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1985, p. 37.

17. Ruddick's view is elaborated in her "Maternal Thinking," in *Feminist Studies*, Summer 1980. My reservations about this position are explained in my "Second Persons."

18. This is Mark Platt's concept, elaborated in his *Ways of Meaning*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979.

19. The position I refer to is developed in her book, *In a Different Voice*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982. I introduce her position here with the claim that men and women speak in different moral voices rather than adhering to Gilligan's own formulation, where women are said to speak in a different voice— presumably from men's. The rephrasing is important for two reasons: first, it catches the symmetry of the relation of difference. If women speak in a different voice from men then clearly men, too, speak in a different voice from women. Secondly, and concomitantly, it dispels any residual impression that it is the male voice which constitutes the norm, from which the female voice is declared to deviate.

20. In her elaboration of these points, Gilligan draws particularly upon Nancy Chodorow's position, developed in *The Reproduction of Mothering*. Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1979. For an account of how such practices contribute to the creation of "autonomous man" see Chapter 9, "Mother-Monopolized Child Rearing" of Isaac Balbus' *Marxism and Domination*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982.

21. I am thinking here of Annette Baier's observations to this effect in her paper "Doing Without a Moral Theory?" in her *Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind and Morals*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985.

22. Baier, p. 232.

23. Virginia Held, for example, maintains that the form of moral reflection for which she is arguing in *Rights and Goods* "can be plausible only if one's conception of morality includes both deontological and teleological components and allows for different resolutions of tensions between egoistic and communal claims in different domains. A pure Kantian, a pure utilitarian, a pure egoist, and a pure communitarian would find the analysis...hard to reconcile with his or her morality." (p. 35).

24. Held, p. 59.

Thetis

i remember the sixties
all those long haired draft dodgers
all those sons of Thetis
knowing (however unconsciously)
that a way to avoid killing
a way to stop making war
is to become women
(however incompletely)

Chris Wind
Ontario